Sweden and Ukraine

Total commitments

2.975bn € (Rank: 10)

0.513% of GDP (Rank: 13)

Military commitments

2.029bn € (Rank: 9)

0.350% of GDP (Rank: 12)

Humanitarian commitments

0.638bn € (Rank: 6)

0.110% of GDP (Rank: 5)

Financial commitments

0.308bn € (Rank: 15)

0.053% of GDP (Rank: 12)

Video from Zelenskyy TG, in Kyiv, Text of From Ukrainian Foreign Ministry


Weapons and equipment

The largest share of Sweden’s military support to Ukraine consists of weapons and equipment.

The support of weapons and equipment includes, among others, artillery pieces (Archer), tank 122 (Leopard 2), grenade launcher (Carl Gustaf) with ammunition, anti-tank gun (AT4), anti-tank robot 57 (NLAW), automatic rifle, mine clearance equipment and combat vehicle 90 (CV 90), helmets, advanced ammunition, naval target robot 17, anti-tank systems, personal all-terrain vehicles, winter equipment, aiming devices, body protection, tents, masking nets and anti-aircraft systems.

Financial support through funds

Sweden has made financial contributions to the following funds for military support to Ukraine:

  • NATO Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Package Trust Fund
  • International Fund for Ukraine (IFU)
  • Fund of the Ukrainian Central Bank for the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Swedish-Ukrainian procurement cooperation

The Defense Materiel Agency, FMV, receives permission from the government to negotiate with the competent authority in Ukraine and enter into international agreements regarding, among other things, the procurement of defense materiel. The agreement also includes cooperation on support in the construction and development of the procurement organization and procurement activities, as well as the exchange of information and experience in the field.

Supply solution for munitions

The armed forces have been tasked with implementing a supply solution for munitions systems to Ukraine. Within the supply solution, the Swedish Armed Forces can operate with up to 60 people on site in Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

Since 2022, Sweden has delivered a large number of different types of equipment systems, with Swedish maintenance support limited to preparing the equipment followed by transport to Ukraine. However, more qualified weapon and sensor systems require a longer-term supply solution containing technical system support, spare parts and replacement units as well as ammunition to maintain operational effectiveness over time. The armed forces therefore intend to build a long-term supply solution for qualified materiel systems, such as robotic system 70, combat vehicle 90, tank 122 and Archer, which have been donated to Ukraine. The supply system is created through collaboration between the Armed Forces, the Defense Materiel Administration and current Swedish industry.

The assignment runs until December 31, 2025.

Czech ammunition initiative

To contribute to Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s war of aggression, the Czech Republic has taken an initiative to buy large volumes of ammunition with short delivery times on the world market where more countries can contribute financing.

The government has decided that the Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) may negotiate and enter into an agreement with the responsible authority in the Czech Republic for financial support for the procurement of ammunition to Ukraine. Sweden intends to support the Czech Republic with 30 million euros in this initiative.

The financing of the contribution is made within the framework of Support Package 15 in the part that refers to support in the form of financial contributions to funds and a number of bilateral and multilateral donation projects that countries within the EU and NATO have established with the aim of supporting Ukraine.

Educational efforts in support of Ukraine

Training package

The government has decided on a framework assignment for the Armed Forces to carry out and participate in military training of Ukrainian citizens in 2024. Ongoing training efforts are extended (e.g. EUMAM, NLETI, Interflex) and can be supplemented with additional activities. With this framework assignment to the Armed Forces, the authority gets partly better conditions to plan operations over the year, and partly better conditions to respond to rapidly arising Ukrainian training needs.

The decision also means that the Armed Forces are given the opportunity to conduct training both bilaterally and multilaterally within Sweden or within another EU or NATO country. The decision also covers access to Swedish territory for Ukrainian units.

The content of the training package is based on experiences from 2023 as well as assessments of new training requirements that the recently established capability coalitions (within the framework of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group) will bring. It is estimated that over 18,000 Ukrainian electricians may pass through the training activities that the Swedish instructors will participate in during 2024.

Examples of training that may become relevant with the support of this training package are the following:

  • Training on equipment that Sweden has donated.
  • Participation in various types of multilateral training activities, such as Interflex or Interforge which is a training activity aimed at training in amphibious warfare.
  • Training within the framework of one of the capability coalitions that Sweden is a member of. For example, marine training in the form of amphibious combat technology or naval mine clearance within the framework of the Maritime Security coalition or participation in training activities within various types of land mine clearance within the Demining Coalition.
  • Manager training, where Swedish instructors conduct courses for future group or platoon leaders as well as tactical training for staff officers.

Training on the JAS 39 Gripen

The armed forces have been tasked with the orientation training of Ukrainian pilots and associated aviation technical personnel on the JAS 39. The background is that the armed forces of Ukraine have expressed requests to be able to operationally evaluate the JAS 39 as one of the most urgent measures is to strengthen the Ukrainian air defense with a NATO-interoperable combat aircraft systems.

The JAS 39 has a very good ability to operate in the requested air defense role but also as an attack and reconnaissance aircraft. The JAS 39 Gripen is fully NATO interoperable and was developed to operate from dispersed road bases, which has proven to be critical to the survival of the Ukrainian Air Force. In addition, the JAS 39 can be refueled and rearmed in a short time and conscripts are used in the preparation of the aircraft.

EUMAM Ukraine

Since spring 2023, Sweden has been participating in the EU’s military mission in support of Ukraine (European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, EUMAM Ukraine). Swedish instructors contribute to medical training and infantry battalion training at the Special Training Command (ST-C), one of the operation’s two force headquarters, in Germany. Within the framework of EUMAM Ukraine, Sweden has also carried out training on donated military equipment. 

The operation provides basic and specialized training for Ukrainian soldiers on the territory of EU member states. The strategic objective is to strengthen the military capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, so that Ukraine can defend its territorial integrity and effectively exercise its sovereignty.

EUMAM Ukraine is led by the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) in Brussels, which serves as a strategic and operational headquarters for the operation. Sweden has contributed reinforcement personnel to the MPCC since autumn 2022 and will continue to do so until November 2024.


In addition, Sweden contributes to the British-led operation Operation Interflex, which carries out basic military training for Ukrainian citizens. Sweden participated in 2022 with 60 staff officers and/or instructors, and will continue to contribute in 2023 as well.

Mine clearance training in Lithuania

The government decided on 22 December 2022 that Sweden will help train Ukrainian demining soldiers. In the project, the Armed Forces will train 48 Ukrainian instructors who will then train 100 demining soldiers each in Ukraine. This means that around 4,800 people will have been trained in demining by the end of the year. The Swedish instructors will be distributed from the Swedish EOD and Demining Center (Swedec), which is Sweden’s competence center for national and international tasks in ammunition and demining.

The demining work has a decisive importance for the mobility of the Ukrainian units in general, but is especially important for the mobility of the mechanized units when they have to carry out an offensive. As a high attack rate is crucial, both for the possibility of gaining terrain and not to risk being fought. Military logistics also rely on mobility as much of the support the attacking units require consists of transport of various kinds. A developed demining capability also supports civil society during current wars and is of central importance when Ukraine is to be rebuilt.

The training takes place in Lithuania within the framework of Nordefco and began in March 2023. Lithuania supports the effort via the provision of training terrain and logistics. Instructors from Sweden, Iceland and Norway participate in the training, which will be carried out in four rounds during 2023.


Humanitarian and civilian support to Ukraine


Sweden has been providing extensive aid to Ukraine for many years, both in terms of reform-oriented development cooperation and humanitarian support. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Sweden has contributed the equivalent of approximately SEK 7.1 billion to humanitarian and civilian support (December 11, 2023). This includes, among other things, increased aid through support for humanitarian organizations, support for promoting women’s and girls’ opportunities and rights, civilian crisis management in the form of donations of, for example, medical equipment, fire protection, generators and tents. Sweden also contributes extensive support to Ukraine’s reform work and reconstruction.

Humanitarian aid

The humanitarian aid amounts to approximately SEK 2.1 billion. It includes efforts via organizations that effectively provide the Ukrainian people and refugees with necessities via mainly the World Food Program (WFP), the Red Cross Movements ICRC, IFRC and URCS, the UN Humanitarian Land Fund for Ukraine, Save the Children, UNICEF, UNHCR, MSB, Norweigan Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, Action Against Hunger and International Rescue Committee. Sweden has also supported transport of 50,000 tonnes of wheat to alleviate the consequences of the war for vulnerable countries via the WFP and has given support of SEK 100 million to Ukraine’s “Grain from Ukraine” initiative.

Financial support

Due to the Russian aggression, Ukraine has lost access to international capital markets. In addition to regular core support to the World Bank, Sweden has issued a guarantee of approximately SEK 500 million to Ukraine. In December, further aid to Ukraine was announced via the World Bank of SEK 600 million. The support will go to important investments in the energy sector, Ukrainian agriculture, the education sector and the housing sector in order to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience in the longer term. A total of SEK 1.1 billion.

Civil crisis management

The support for civilian crisis management amounts to approximately SEK 800 million. Through MSB, Sweden has contributed with emergency aid in the form of, among other things, coordination and transport of medical equipment, medevac transport of the wounded and sick for treatment in Sweden, demining, protective equipment, fire protection, emergency shelters, power grid equipment, and generators.


So far, the government has supported Ukraine with approximately SEK 1.69 billion for efforts to rebuild Ukraine. It is about support for the sustainable reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure via the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD, the World Bank’s Ukraine Fund and the Nordic Environmental Finance Company Nefco, the Energy Community’s Energy Support Fund for Ukraine, UNDP and Eurocontrol. Sweden also has coordinating responsibility for waste management in Ukraine according to an agreement with President Zelenskyj in the summer of 2022.

Reform support

Ukraine’s reform needs are great and Sweden has until July 2023 provided annual bilateral reform support to Ukraine within the framework of the Strategy for Sweden’s reform cooperation with Eastern Europe 2021–2027. In 2022, the support amounted to over SEK 335 million and included efforts for inclusive economic development, gender equality, environment and energy, democracy and human rights, independent media, support for civil society, decentralization reform and public administration reform, peace building and resilience. 

In July 2023, the government adopted a new bilateral aid strategy for Sweden’s development and reform cooperation with Ukraine, which breaks out of the Eastern Europe Strategy:

Strategy for Sweden’s construction and reform cooperation with Ukraine 2023–2027

Reform and development support under the two strategies since February 2022 amounts to approximately SEK 1.19 billion. 

Strategic support

A range of strategic support worth approximately SEK 266 million goes to, among other things, free media, cyber security, accountability, nuclear security and gender equality. 

Sanctions against Russia


The EU’s sanctions against Russia contain import and export restrictions on goods and services in a number of economic sectors with a focus on, among other things, high technology and energy. The sanctions contain extensive restrictions in the financial sector as well as a number of prohibitions, including the closure of airspace for access by Russian aircraft and ports for calls by Russian ships. A number of Russian media companies are also subject to sanctions. Requirements have also been introduced for companies in the EU to contractually stipulate that further export to Russia is prohibited when exporting certain goods to third countries.

In terms of sanctions against individuals and entities, the list includes over 1,900 individuals and entities. The sanctions include the freezing of assets in the EU, a ban on making funds available to those listed and a ban on travel into or through the EU.

The sanctions complement the measures imposed against Russia since 2014 as a result of the illegal annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine:Sanctions regarding Russia and Ukraine

Compilation of sanctions against Russia 

The following is a summary of sanctions implemented against Russia due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It is a summary description and not a complete account.

Sanctions Package 13 (February 23, 2024)

On February 23, the EU’s thirteenth sanctions package against Russia was adopted. The package focuses on companies in the Russian arms industry and includes, among other things:

  • 27 new entities in Russia and third countries are added to the list of entities subject to stricter export restrictions due to their support to Russia’s military and industrial complex.
  • The UK is added to the list of partner countries that have similar restrictive measures to the EU regarding the import of iron and steel.
  • The export bans are extended, among other things with regard to certain electrical transformers.
  • 106 additional persons and 88 entities are included in the sanctions list. The decision covers, among others, persons and entities in the Russian and Belarusian military industry, public representatives of the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory, persons and entities responsible for the abduction of Ukrainian children from occupied territories, as well as persons and connected to Russian imports of weapons and ammunition.

Returns on Russian state assets should be able to be used for the reconstruction of Ukraine (February 12, 2024)

On 12 February 2024, the EU decided that central securities depositories holding Russian central bank assets exceeding one million euros must ensure the traceability of the proceeds, so that the majority of these proceeds can be used in the future for the reconstruction of Ukraine. The funds are estimated to amount to approximately EUR 15 billion over the next four years. Further decisions within the EU will be required for the funds to finally be transferred to Ukraine.

Sanctions Package 12 (December 18, 2023)

On December 18, the EU’s twelfth sanctions package against Russia was adopted. The package focuses on additional economic and anti-circumvention measures and includes, among other things:

  • Ban on the import of Russian diamonds, Russian gas oil and certain metal goods.
  • Ban on the export of tankers to Russia.
  • Extended export bans, including tools, technology and other goods such as certain metals that can be used in Russian industry.
  • Requirement for companies in the EU to, when exporting certain goods to third countries, contractually stipulate that further export to Russia is prohibited.
  • The ban on transiting goods through Russia is extended to more categories of goods and technology, including certain components and goods that can be used in Russian industry.
  • 29 new entities in Russia and third countries are added to the list of entities subject to stricter export restrictions.
  • Over 140 additional individuals and entities are included in the sanctions list. The decision covers, among others, senior military officials and decision-makers, propagandists, businessmen and people who contributed to conducting illegal “elections” on occupied Ukrainian territory, as well as companies that support or operate within the Russian military-industrial complex.

Sanctions Package 11 (June 23, 2023)

On June 23, the second sanctions package against Russia was adopted under the Swedish presidency. The package focuses on measures to counter circumvention of the sanctions and includes:

  • A new tool that gives the EU the possibility to introduce export restrictions for certain goods to third countries to counter circumvention of the sanctions. The measure requires a separate decision to be implemented.
  • The ban on the transit of goods through Russia is extended to more categories of goods and technology (goods and technology that can contribute to Russia’s military and technological capabilities or to the development of the defense and security sector).
  • 87 new units are added to the list of units subject to stricter export restrictions.
  • The export restrictions extend to intellectual property rights and trade secrets, as well as new goods and products, including components found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine.
  • Temporary broadcast ban for media companies that broadcast disinformation and war propaganda is extended to apply to five more companies.
  • The ban on access to EU ports is extended to ships engaged in transshipment of oil at sea if it can be suspected of circumventing the oil embargo and the oil price ceiling or shuts down certain navigation systems while transporting Russian oil.
  • Tightening of the import ban on certain steel and iron goods by requiring a certificate of origin for goods imported from third countries.
  • Over 100 additional persons and entities are included in the sanctions list. The decision covers senior military officials and policy makers, people involved in the forced transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, judges responsible for politically motivated sentences against Ukrainian citizens, people responsible for the looting of cultural heritage, additional businessmen, propagandists, some Russian IT companies, banks operating in the occupied territories and units of the Russian Armed Forces.
  • The listing criterion directed at persons and entities that facilitate violations of the prohibition against circumvention of the sanctions is extended to include persons and entities that otherwise significantly oppose those provisions.

Sanctions against the Wagner group (April 13, 2023)

As a follow-up to the tenth sanctions package, two more entities are added to the sanctions list against activities that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

  • The Wagner group (already subject to EU sanctions under the global human rights sanctions regime, is a Russia-based private military force founded in 2014 led by Dmitry Utkin and financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin).
  • RIA FAN (which is part of the Russian media group Patriot Media Group where Yevgeny Prigozhin is chairman of the board, participates in pro-government propaganda and disinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine).

Sanctions Package 10 (February 24, 2023)

In conjunction with the anniversary of Russia’s illegal and full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU adopted its tenth package of sanctions against Russia. It is the first package to be adopted during Sweden’s presidency of the EU. The package contains:

  • Actions that strike at Russian warfighting capabilities, with a focus on actions that limit Russia’s and Iran’s access to advanced technology. This includes an extension of bans on, among other things, high-tech dual-use products that can be used by Russia for military and technological reinforcements. The list of prohibited end users of such products is also expanded, including units under the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Lists are also being introduced against individuals with prominent roles in companies that produce weapons in support of the Russian military, including several Iranian individuals involved in the supply of drones to Russia.
  • Listings of several commanders within the Russian Wagner Group. They are listed for their role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and for suspected crimes against humanity in Mali, Sudan, Central African Republic and Libya.
  • Additional sanctions are also being imposed on political decision-makers, such as local representatives of the areas of eastern Ukraine illegally annexed by Russia, as well as Russian politicians responsible for the deportation of children from Ukraine.
  • Sanctions are also imposed on some of Russia’s largest banks (Alfa Bank, Rosbank, Tinkoff Bank) and on Russia’s largest commercial vehicle manufacturer GAZ.
  • Actions against Russian propaganda and disinformation in support of Russia’s illegal war. This includes listings of Rossiya Segodnjia, which owns state-run Russian TV channel Sputnik, as well as restrictions on RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic’s broadcasts. Sanctions are also directed at the All-Russia People’s Front, which owns the rights to the war propaganda symbol “Z”.
  • The reporting requirements on the assets frozen due to the sanctions are also strengthened to ensure that the sanctions are complied with and to prevent their circumvention.

On February 24, EU member states also decided to extend the sanctions against Belarus by twelve months until February 28, 2024.

Price ceiling petroleum products (February 2, 2023)

  • The price ceiling is established for the provision of sea transport and services for the export of two categories of petroleum products from Russia to countries outside the EU. One category is petroleum products sold below the price of crude oil with a price cap of $45 and the other is petroleum products sold above the price of crude oil, $100.
  • The price ceiling is the highest price per barrel for which Russia can deliver petroleum products via sea transport to countries outside the EU.

Sanctions Package 9 (December 16, 2022)

  • Expanded export bans on products that could contribute to Russia’s military and technological capabilities and development of its defense and security sector (drone engines, additional chemical and biological products, riot control agents and electronic components).
  • Expanding the list of prohibited end-users for weapons, PDAs and advanced technology to include certain Russian-controlled entities based in Crimea or Sevastopol.
  • The Russian Regional Development Bank is added to the list of entities subject to the transaction ban.
  • EU nationals are prohibited from holding any positions in the governing bodies of any Russian state-owned or controlled legal person, entity or body in Russia.
  • The ban on providing certain services is extended to advertising, market research and opinion polls, as well as product testing and technical inspection services.
  • The ban on new investments in the energy sector is extended to the mining sector.
    The broadcasting ban is extended to include the media companies NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV, Pervyi Kanal.
  • Listing of additional members of the Duma and the Federation Council, ministers, governors, individuals from the Constitutional Court, individuals with leading positions in the occupied territories, as well as companies within the military-industrial complex, Russian parties, media companies and other entities operating for propaganda purposes.

Crude oil price ceiling (December 3, 2022)

  • Price caps are set for the provision of marine transportation and services for the export of crude oil from Russia to countries outside the EU at USD 60 per barrel.
  • The price ceiling is the highest price per barrel for which Russia can deliver petroleum products via sea transport to countries outside the EU.

Sanctions Package 8 (6 October 2022)

  • Restrictive measures related to the recognition of the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine are extended to all non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson Oblasts of Ukraine.
  • A new listing criterion is introduced to target those who help circumvent EU sanctions.
  • Additional listings against around thirty individuals and entities. Among other things, individuals responsible for the implementation of the illegal so-called “referendums” on occupied parts of Ukrainian territory.
  • Import bans are extended to include certain steel products and additional goods that generate significant revenue for Russia, including pulp, paper, certain stones, precious metals, machinery, chemicals, cigarettes, plastics and finished chemical products such as cosmetics.
  • Export bans are extended to include certain chemical substances. Prohibitions also apply to a number of electronic products and products used in the aviation industry as well as chemical products. The export ban is also extended to cover certain weapons and ammunition, including so-called “tasers”.
  • The ban on the export of services is extended, among other things, with regard to legal advice.
  • No ships registered in the Russian ship register, regardless of flag, are allowed to enter EU ports.
  • Ban for EU citizens to sit on the board of Russian state-owned or controlled companies is introduced.
  • An oil price ceiling must be introduced, as part of the implementation of the price ceiling developed within the G7. The mechanism regulates the possibility for shipping companies within the EU to transport oil to third countries under a specified price level. The aim is that Russian oil revenues should be limited, certain third countries should be able to get a lower price, and European carriers should not be disadvantaged compared to other carriers when delivering to third countries.

Measures regarding visas (9 September 2022)

  • The 2007 visa facilitation agreement between the EU and Russia has been completely suspended. This means that an application for a Schengen visa for Russian citizens is now examined according to the EU’s visa code.

Sanctions Package 7 (July 21, 2022)

  • Ban on the import of gold originating in Russia
  • Strengthening of restrictions against dual-use items and advanced technologies, especially with use in the defense and security sector
  • Additional individuals (54) and entities (10) are placed on the sanctions list, including the mayor of Moscow and Sberbank. Individuals under sanctions must declare their assets to facilitate freezing.
  • Russian-flagged ships are denied access to locks.
  • Additional restrictions in the financial sector.
  • Certain exceptions are made for, among other things, agricultural products and certain pharmaceutical products.
  • A number of clarifications regarding, among other things, public procurement and air traffic.

Sanctions Package 6 (June 3, 2022)

  • Import ban on crude oil and petroleum products from Russia, with a phase-out period of 6-8 months and a temporary exception for oil delivered via pipeline.
  • Exclusion of three more Russian banks from the SWIFT payment messaging service, including Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank.
  • Suspension of broadcast operations of three additional state-controlled Russian media channels.
  • Additional export restrictions on dual-use items and technology in the defense and security sector.
  • Ban on services in accounting, PR and consulting.
  • Additional individuals (65) and entities (18) are placed on the sanctions list (total now 1158 individuals and 98 entities).

Sanctions Package 5 (8 April 2022)

  • Prohibition of granting access to ports within the EU to vessels registered under the Russian flag.
  • Ban on buying or importing coal originating in Russia from August 2022.
  • Ban on Russian-registered road transport companies operating in the EU
  • Previous bans on the import and export of certain goods to and from Russia are being extended.
  • Further tightening of sanctions against the Russian financial sector. Restrictions on support to Russian state-owned or -controlled companies from the EU and member states
  • Russian citizens and companies are no longer allowed to participate in public procurement in the EU.
  • Additional individuals and entities/companies are added to the EU sanctions list. Those affected include business owners who support or benefit from the Russian government and individuals and family members associated with them; ministers and members of the “People’s Council” in Donetsk and Luhansk; as well as companies and entities that contribute to undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Sanctions Package 4 (March 15, 2022)

  • Ban on the export of goods or technology in the area of ​​iron and steel.
    Import ban for iron and steel products originating in Russia or exported from Russia.
  • Ban on export of goods or technology and ban on investment and insurance and reinsurance in the energy sector. (Some exceptions are made in the bans for activities necessary for the transport of coal, oil, gas and titanium from Russia to the EU, as well as civil nuclear power).
  • Ban on the export of luxury products to individuals, entities and bodies in Russia or for use in Russia if these exceed 300 euros in value.
  • Prohibition against directly or indirectly participating in transactions with state-owned or state-controlled entities or bodies.
  • Prohibition on providing credit rating services later than 30 days after the decision has entered into force.
  • Tightening of the export restrictions on dual-use items, goods and technology in the defense and security sector and the aerospace sector.
  • Expanded list of entities linked to Russia’s defense and industrial base.
  • Air traffic controllers’ responsibility for rejecting proposed overflights from actors that do not have access to EU airspace is clarified.
  • Listings of additional individuals (15 items) and entities (9 items). The individuals and entities listed are either involved in economic sectors that provide a substantial source of income for the Russian government or have acted to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

Sanctions decided by the EU on March 9, 2022

The Council has decided on new sanctions as well as a number of clarifications and clarifications of previous decisions.

  • The extent of asset freezing is clarified, for example that cryptocurrencies are included as well as stocks, bonds and securities.
  • Addendum on export control for maritime technology to Russia, as well as a number of clarifications regarding export control.
  • Listings are also suggested by additional individuals. Those listed include leading businessmen involved in economic sectors that constitute a substantial source of income for the Russian government, as well as members of the Federation Council that ratified the friendship treaties between Russia and the so-called People’s Republics.

Sanctions package “3b” (March 2, 2022)

  • Exclusion of seven Russian banks from SWIFT. The seven banks are Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Rossiya Bank, Sovcombank, Vnesheconombank (VEB) and VTB Bank.
  • Ban on investment, participation and other forms of contribution to future projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund
  • Prohibition on the sale, delivery, transfer and export of euro banknotes to Russia or to natural or legal persons or entities in Russia
  • The broadcasting operations in the EU of the Sputnik and Russia Today (RT) channels and their associated media channels are suspended.

Sanctions package “3a” (February 28, 2022)

  • Ban on transactions with the Central Bank of Russia
  • Ban on overflights of EU airspace and against access to EU airports for Russian air carriers
  • New restrictive measures that include additional listings of leading businessmen involved in economic sectors that constitute a substantial source of income for the Russian government, leading decision-makers in both the military and civilian sectors, party representatives and journalists (26). An additional device is listed.

Sanctions Package 2 (February 25, 2022)

  • Measures against loans to additional privately owned banks.
  • Measures against new listings of Russian state-owned enterprises and against the financing of certain state-owned enterprises.
  • Ban on Russian citizens making bank deposits of over EUR 100,000 in EU banks.
  • Prohibition of central securities depositories to have Russian account holders.
  • Ban on the sale of bonds in euros to Russian citizens.
  • Ban on the export of certain technology to the oil sector.
  • Prohibition against selling or providing products and services connected to the aerospace industry.
  • Tightened and broadened export controls for products with dual uses.
  • Prohibition on exporting goods and technology that contribute to Russia’s military and technological development, or development in the defense and security areas.
  • President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov are put on the sanctions list and have their possible assets in EU countries frozen.
  • Listings of additional individuals. Those listed include all Duma members who are not yet on the sanctions list, additional members of Russia’s Security Council, and Belarusian individuals who facilitated the invasion of Ukraine.
  • New criteria for listing individuals who actively support or benefit from the Russian government, as well as leading businessmen involved in economic sectors that constitute a substantial source of income for the Russian government.

Sanctions Package 1 (February 23, 2022)

  • Sanctions against the 351 members of the Russian State Duma who voted on February 15 to call on President Putin to recognize the self-proclaimed “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent, as well as 27 other individuals with positions of responsibility in the military, propaganda and more.
  • Restrictions on economic relations with the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts: ban on imports, ban on financial services, ban on exports in telecommunications, energy and minerals, ban on services in the tourism industry.
  • Restrictions regarding Russia’s access to the EU’s capital and financial markets and financial services.